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Self-Referential Propositions
Bruno Whittle
May 10, 2016
Are there ‘self-referential’ propositions?at is, propositions that say of themselves
that they have a certain property, such as that of being false.ere can seem reason
to doubt that there are. ere are of course self-referential sentences, such as ‘the
proposition expressed by this sentence is false’. But a standard response to these is to
deny that they express propositions, in which case the existence of such sentences
would not entail that of self-referential propositions.
At the same time, there are a number of reasons why the question of whether
there are such propositions is signicant.e rst is as follows. Suppose that there
are indeed no such propositions. One might then hope that while paradoxes such
as the Liar must be grappled with in giving an account of language, one can give
an account of propositions—and of propositional attitudes and acts, such as belief
and assertion—entirely untroubled by such things. at is, one might hope that
although the Liar shows that many plausible principles about sentences must be
given up, no such fate will befall principles about propositions.
Consider, for example, the truth-schema for sentences (i.e. ‘A’ is true i A, for a
sentence A). e existence of Liar sentences (e.g. ‘this sentence is not true’) seems
to give us strong reasons to reject this: since it shows that we cannot maintain
it without being classically inconsistent.1 On the other hand, if there are no Liar
propositions (e.g. propositions that say of themselves that they are not true), then
onemight hope to maintain the truth-schema for these while remaining classically
consistent.2 Onemight even hope to keep both the truth-schema and classical logic
1us, most recent work on truth for sentences does indeed reject it: e.g. Kripke [1975], Gupta
[1982], Herzberger [1982], McGee [1991], Gupta and Belnap [1993], Maudlin [2004] and Leitgeb
[2005]. (Although there are exceptions to this trend, such as Priest [1979, 1987/2006], Field [2008]
and Beall [2009].)
2For example, Sobel [1992] and Glanzberg [2001] maintain the truth-schema for propositions,
and certainly do not mean to embrace classical inconsistency. Indeed, Glanzberg goes so far as
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for propositions. But the existence of self-referential propositions—in particular,
Liar propositions—would frustrate such hopes.
Similarly, the existence of Liar sentences seems to provide strong reasons to
reject bivalence for sentences (i.e. the principle that every sentence is either true or
false). But one might hope to maintain this for propositions.3 Again, however, the
existence of self-referential propositions would seem to dash such hopes.
A further group of reasons why the question of whether there are self-referen-
tial propositions matters is as follows. As I have in eect noted, a standard re-
sponse to Liar sentences is to deny that they express propositions.4 But if there are
self-referential propositions, i.e. Liar propositions, then we would have a version
of the paradox whose solution would require something fundamentally dierent
from this standard move. Indeed, the existence of such propositions would seem
to challenge this traditional claim about Liar sentences. For standard arguments for
this claim use either the truth-schema or bivalence for propositions (which would
be challenged by the existence of Liar propositions). Further, since the sentential
and propositional versions of the paradox would seem to be very similar, it would
seem desirable to give similar solutions. But then, since the solution in the propo-
sitional case will not deny that something expresses a proposition, it seems that the
solution in the sentential case shouldn’t either.
All of this makes a suggestion of Saul Kripke’s particularly intriguing. For in
his celebrated paper on truth (in a footnote, no less) he suggests that as long as
propositions are ‘structured’, it may be possible to apply Gödelian techniques for
generating self-reference directly to them (1975: 713). e result would be a range
of self-referential propositions, including Liar propositions. us, since proposi-
tions are indeed structured on many of the most popular—and apparently most
plausible—accounts, this would seem to be highly signicant. So it is surprising
thatKripke’s suggestion does not seem to have been pursued.e aimof the present
paper, however, is to pursue it and show it to be correct.
e structure of the paper is as follows. §1 contains preliminaries. §2 outlines
the construction of self-referential propositions. §3 considers objections. §4 spells
out why the existence of such propositions matters. And §5 goes through the con-
struction of such propositions in full.
to write: I doubt that anything that failed to validate [it] could count as a reasonable theory of
propositions (2001: 228).
3For example, Skyrms [1984], Sobel [1992] and Gaifman [2000] all give up bivalence for sen-
tences but maintain it for propositions.
4See, e.g., Skyrms [1984], Sobel [1992], Gaifman [2000] and Glanzberg [2001].
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1 Preliminaries
1.1 Propositions
For the purposes of this paper, then, I assume that propositions are ‘structured’,
i.e. in a way that mirrors the structures of the sentences that express them.5 is is
true on the traditional Fregean and Russellian accounts, and I would argue that it is
likely to be true on any adequate account—but that is not of course a case that I will
make here.6 Indeed, for deniteness, I will assume a broadly Russellian approach
(unless otherwise stated). at is, I will assume that the proposition that John is
tall, for example, is a structured entity built out of John together with the property
of being tall. (I will say much more about how I propose to think about proposi-
tions in §5.) However, everything that I will say could easily be made compatible
with a Fregean approach, or any other on which propositions have a sentence-like
structure.
1.2 Self-Reference
A self-referential proposition is one that says of itself that it has a certain property
and that does not say anything else. us, an atomic proposition F(p) (i.e. the
proposition that p is F) such that p = F(p) would be self-referential. at is, if
there really are such propositions, then they would be self-referential (although
that there are is something that one might doubt: see below). Similarly, a negated
atomic proposition¬G(q) such that q = ¬G(q)would be self-referential. As would
be a proposition r of the form ∀x(H(x) → J(x)) such that H applies precisely to
r. And so on. is is not a completely precise characterization, but it will suce
for the purposes of this paper.
It is hard to deny that there are self-referential sentences. AsKripke pointed out,
we can produce one simply by baptizing the string ‘Jack is short’: Jack (1975: 693). In
contrast, it seems very far from obvious that there are self-referential propositions.
For, assuming that propositions are Russellian, one analogous to ‘Jack is short’
would be of the form S(p), where S is the property of being short and p = S(p).
But then p would have itself as a constituent: something that is plausibly impossi-
ble (just as it is plausibly impossible for a set to contain itself). If propositions are
5However, if there is a mismatch between the surface and the logical form of the sentence, then
it is the structure of the latter that is mirrored.
6On structured propositions see, e.g., Salmon [1986], Soames [1987, 2010], Kaplan [1989], Fine
[2007] and King [2007].
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instead Fregean, then an atomic proposition about itself would not have itself as a
constituent. But it would be made out of a mode of presentation of a proposition
made out of that very mode, which, again, is plausibly impossible.
One might try rather to produce a self-referential proposition via a sentence
such as ‘the proposition expressed by this sentence is false’. But, as I noted, a stan-
dard response to such sentences is to deny that they express propositions.
1.3 An Alternative Approach
An approach to the question of whether there are self-referential propositions that
is very dierent from that which I will pursue is that of Barwise and Etchemendy
[1987]. at work gives an account of truth focused on propositions, and self-
referential propositions play a central role. However, this account does not in fact
seem well-suited to establishing the existence of such propositions.
It uses the non-wellfounded set theory of Aczel [1988] to provide models of
such propositions. For example, a proposition ¬T(p) that says of itself that it is
untrue (i.e. such that p = ¬T(p)) is modelled by something like a set that contains
itself (more precisely: a set that belongs to its own transitive closure7). But if one is
unsure whether there is a proposition of this form about itself—for example, on the
grounds that such a proposition would have to have itself as a constituent—then
one is unlikely to be convinced by the existence of such models. Aer all, the ex-
istence of such a model no more establishes that there really is such a proposition
than the existence of non-standard models of arithmetic establishes that there re-
ally is a natural number with innitely many predecessors. A similar point can be
made about any of the other models of self-referential propositions given in that
work, all of which employ non-wellfounded sets in a similar way. In contrast, the
approach pursued below does not use anything like these non-wellfounded mod-
els and, in part because of this, would seemmuch better suited to establishing that
there really are self-referential propositions.
2 Self-Referential Propositions: Outline
e idea is thus to construct self-referential propositions using a version of Gödel’s
‘diagonal’ function. In this section I will outline the construction, and show how
the resulting propositions give rise to propositional versions of paradoxes such as
7e transitive closure of a set x is the set whose members are the members of x, the members
of the members of x, the members of the members of the members of x, etc.
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the Liar, i.e. versions that do not involve expressions, mental states or similar. e
construction will be given in full in §5.
us, let Z be the proposition 0 = 0. And let d be a function such that for any
proposition p, d(p) is the result of replacing all occurrences of Z in p with p itself
(if p is Z, then d(p) is simply p). For example, if p is the proposition ¬Z, then d(p)
is ¬¬Z, whereas if p is the proposition T(Z) (i.e. the proposition that Z is true),
then d(p) is T(T(Z)). How d behaves with arguments that are not propositions
will not matter, but for deniteness let’s assume that d sends any such thing to 0.
is function seems straightforward, and so prima facie it seems hard to deny
that it exists (although I will consider attempts in §3). However, given such a func-
tion, it is straightforward to construct self-referential propositions, such as one that
says of itself that it is untrue.
Before giving the construction, I shouldmake clear how Iwill think about func-
tions in connection with propositions, that is, how functions are constituents of
propositions. Specically, I will take it that just as formulas of standard formal lan-
guages can contain function symbols in addition to names and predicate symbols,
so propositions can contain functions in addition to objects and properties. For
example, the proposition that the successor of 0 is a number, i.e. N(s(0)), is built
from N , s and 0, and is thus distinct from N(1), which is built simply from N and
1.
e alternative—to identify such propositions—would seem unnatural. For
consider the proposition that s is an injection, for example: ∀x∀y(s(x) = s(y) →
x = y). ere does not seem to be any way of conceiving of this, except as con-
taining s. But then it is hard to see why one should deny that the instances of this
proposition—or N(s(0))—also contain this function.8
I should add, however, that nothing essential turns on this stance about func-
tions. If one objects to it, one could construct self-referential propositions in a sim-
ilar way, but using relations rather than functions (see §3). However, it is simplest
to use functions, and so that is the construction that I focus on.
us, given d we can construct a self-referential proposition as follows:¬T(d(¬T(d(Z)))),
8In support of the identication ofN(s(0)) andN(1) onemight note that it is natural to describe
the sentences ‘s(0) is a number’ and ‘1 is a number’ as being ‘about the same thing’ (i.e. 1). However,
there are many other cases where we would give a comparable description, but where we would
certainly not want to say that the things in question are constituents of the propositions expressed.
For example, it is natural to describe ‘all odd primes are φ’ and ‘all primes greater than two are φ’
as being ‘about the same things’, but we would not want to say that these innitely many numbers
are constituents of the propositions in question.
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i.e. the proposition that d(¬T(d(Z))) is untrue. Call this LP (for ‘Liar proposi-
tion’). LP says of itself that it is untrue: for d(¬T(d(Z))) is just LP (this is what
you get if you replace every occurrence of Z in ¬T(d(Z)) with ¬T(d(Z)) itself).
We are then led, via plausible steps, to contradiction. For, as we have seen:
(1) d(¬T(d(Z))) = LP.
But, for any proposition p, ¬T(d(p)) is the proposition that d(p) is not true. So it
seems that ¬T(d(p)) is true i d(p) is not. In particular:
(2) LP is true i d(¬T(d(Z))) is not.
But then by (2) and (1) we have:
(3) LP is true i it is not.
Further, one can construct a whole range of self-referential propositions in a
similar way, giving rise to propositional versions of every other paradox (or puzzle)
that results from a self-referential sentence. For example, a proposition that says of
itself that it is true will give a propositional version of the truth-teller; one that says
of itself that if it is true, then 0 = 1, will give a version of Curry’s paradox; and so
on.
Let M be the proposition Mont Blanc =Mont Blanc.en, for any proposition
p, we can construct a proposition p* that says of itself exactly what p says of M.
us, if p is T(M), then p* will say of itself that it is true, whereas if p is T(M) →
0 = 1, p* will say that if it is true, then 0 = 1. Here is how to do this: assuming,
for simplicity, that Z does not occur in p. First, let p′ be the result of replacing all
occurrences ofM in pwith d(Z).en, to obtain p*, replace all of the occurrences
of Z in p′with p′ itself (i.e. p* = d(p′)).is propositionwill say of itself whatever p
said ofM. For p* clearly says of d(p′)whatever p said ofM (since the occurrences
of d(p′) in p* are precisely those that replaced occurrences of M in p). But d(p′)
is p*.
Indeed, we can use a similar method to produce propositions that form more
complex networks. For example, propositions p and q such that p says that q is
true, while q says that p is not, or an innite sequence of propositions with the
structure of Yablo’s paradox.
For example, to produce p and q consider a function e as follows, using In for
the proposition n = n: for propositions r and t, e(r, t) is the result of replacing, in
r, all occurrences of I1 with r, and all occurrences of I2 with t.en, if
p′ = T(e(I2, I1)), and
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q′ = ¬T(e(I2, I1)),
we are done by letting
p = T(e(q′, p′)), and
q = ¬T(e(p′, q′))
(it is easy to see that e(q′, p′) = q and e(p′, q′) = p).
To generate an innite sequence of propositions, where each member talks
about later ones, we proceed as follows. Consider a function f such that, for any
propositions p0, p1 . . . , pn , . . . , f (p0, p1, . . . , pn , . . . ) is the result of replacing, in
p0, all occurrences of Ii with pi , for each i ≥ 1.9 We can then produce an in-
nite sequence of propositions, where each says that the next is true, for example, as
follows. First, for each n ≥ 1, let
q′n = T( f (In+1, I1, I2, . . . )).
en if
qn = T( f (q′n+1, q′1, q′2, . . . )),
q1, . . . , qn, . . . are as required.10
I will give these constructionsmore carefully in §5.at is, I will show how they
can be carried out within a natural, but more precisely stated, account of proposi-
tions. First, however, I will consider objections to the claim that propositions along
the lines constructed above exist (§3), and then—having answered these—Iwill ex-
plainwhy the existence of such propositionswould seem to be signicant (§4). (e
outline above will suce for these discussions.) I will focus on the example of LP,
but similar points apply to the whole range of propositions constructed above.
9at is, f is an ω-ary function, with a place for each natural number. If desired, one could give
a similar example using a unary function from sequences of propositions.
10e more complicated case, where each proposition says something about all subsequent ones,
is handled as follows. Here is an example where each proposition says that all later ones are untrue
(giving a propositional version of Yablo’s paradox).
q′n = ¬T( f (In+1 , I1 , I2 , . . . ), f (In+2 , I1 , I2 , . . . ), . . . )
qn = ¬T( f (q′n+1 , q′1 , q′2 , . . . ), f (q′n+2 , q′1 , q′2 , . . . ), . . . )
Here ¬T(p1 , p2 , . . . ) is shorthand for: ¬T(p1)∧¬T(p2)∧ . . . .e sequence q1 , . . . , qn , . . . is then
as required. One could give a similar example without innite conjunctions, but for reasons of space
I omit the details.
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3 Objections
e most obvious possible objection is as follows. It is essential to the above con-
struction that d can apply to propositions that contain this function. What, then,
about simply denying that a function can ever apply to a proposition that contains
it?
To be eective as ameans of denying that there are Liar propositions, onewould
similarly have to deny that a property can apply to a proposition that contains it.
For although the construction above was in terms of a function, one could just as
well use a 2-place property D as follows: for any propositions p and q, D(p, q) i
q is the result of replacing every occurrence of Z in p with p itself. Now consider:
∀x(D(r, x)→ ¬T(x)),
where r is: ∀x(D(Z , x) → ¬T(x)). It is easy to see that this says of itself that it is
untrue, just as LP does.
What, then, about denying that a function or property can apply to a proposi-
tion that contains it?is would seem to be unacceptably restrictive. For example,
there could be no property of being known K that could apply to the proposition
that Z is known in this sense (i.e. K(Z)). Rather, one would need a hierarchy of
properties of being known—leading to problems similar to those faced by Tarski’s
approach to truth.11 Such a blanket prohibition on functions and properties apply-
ing to propositions that contain them would thus seem unacceptable.
If properties, for example, can apply to propositions that contain them, then
they cannot be modelled by sets. More precisely, given the standard account of sets
(i.e. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with urelements, ZFU), one cannot both model
an n-place property with the set of ordered n-tuples that it applies to, and model
a proposition with a set-theoretic construction of its constituents (i.e. a set whose
transitive closure contains these constituents). Since in ZFU no set can belong to
its own transitive closure, whereas the members of an ordered n-tuple do belong
to the transitive closure of that n-tuple, and thus to the transitive closure of any set
whose transitive closure contains the n-tuple. Similarly, if a function can apply to
a proposition that contains it, then—given standard set theory—one cannot both
model an n-place function with a set of ordered n + 1-tuples (in the familiar way),
andmodel a propositionwith a set-theoretic construction of its constituents. How-
ever, as the above example with the property of being known makes clear, even if
not being able to model properties and functions in ZFU in this way is a cost, it
11For this approach, see his [1935]. For its problems, see, e.g., Kripke [1975] and Soames [1999].
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is one that can be avoided only at the apparently much higher one of a severely
restrictive account of propositions.
But one might at this point have the following concern. As I noted in §1, one
can apparently quite reasonably reject as impossible a proposition of the form F(p)
such that p = F(p), on the grounds that such a proposition would have to have
itself as a constituent. Am I now arguing that we should accept that a property or
function can in some sense ‘contain’ itself? Absolutely not. I am arguing that we
should accept that a property or function can apply to a proposition that contains
it. But this entails that the property or function ‘contains’ itself (in some sense) only
if we think of a property or function as ‘containing’ the things that they apply to,
and that seems unmotivated once we recognize the limits of standard set theory
when it comes to modelling properties and functions.
What—as an alternative objection—about denying simply that this particular
function d exists (and similarly that the property D does)? Aer all, I have shown
that d can be used to generate paradoxes. Isn’t that already ground for denying
its existence? No—for the following reason. To determine the value of d for a
given proposition p, all one needs to know is where one particular entity (i.e. Z)
occurs in p. One does not need to know anything aboutwhich things the properties
in p apply to, or about which values the functions in p take. us, given some
straightforward notation for propositions (such as that which I am using, or that
of §5), one could easily write a computer program that, given the notation for a
proposition q as input, gives that of d(q) as output. It would thus seem incredible
to respond to the paradox that LP give rise to—not by revising our naive theory
of T—but rather our naive theory of d. Aer all, when we consider LP, and other
propositions involved in the paradox, itmay not be clearwhetherT applies to them,
but it is completely clear what value d takes when applied to them.
e claim that d exists is also supported by the fact that it would be extremely
dicult, if not impossible, to give an adequate account of propositions without
resources that would enable one to express a function that is at least coextensive
with d (and which would thus generate paradox in just the way that d does). is
is just a propositional version of the familiar point that an adequate account of the
syntax of a standard formal language would seem to require resources sucient to
express (a function coextensive with) a sentential version of d.
us, d exists. But then—given that ¬, T and Z of course also exist—it is hard
to see what could prevent a proposition from resulting from their straightforward
combination as in LP.
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4 Signicance
So self-referential propositions such as LP exist. Why does that matter?
e rst group of reasons concern prima facie plausible principles about truth,
for sentences and propositions. us, Liar sentences show that one cannot main-
tain the truth-schema for sentences while remaining classically consistent. But one
might hope to maintain this for propositions while so remaining.12 Indeed, one
might hope to maintain both this schema and classical logic for propositions. But
LP dashes such hopes.
For to maintain the truth-schema for propositions is to accept every proposi-
tion of the following form, for a proposition p.
(TP) T(p)↔ p
But we have seen that the following proposition is true.
(P1) d(¬T(d(Z))) = ¬T(d(¬T(d(Z))))
While the following is an instance of (TP).
(P2) T(¬T(d(¬T(d(Z)))))↔ ¬T(d(¬T(d(Z))))
But (P1) and (P2) are classically inconsistent. So one cannot maintain (TP) while
being classically consistent, and one cannotmaintain it together with classical logic
(since it entails everything in that logic).
Consider next bivalence. Many approaches to truth give this up for sentences—
on the basis of considerations about Liar sentences—but hold on to it for proposi-
tions.13 However, LP gives us reasons for rejecting bivalence for propositions that
seem every bit as strong as those that Liar sentences give us for rejecting it for sen-
tences.
For example, one argument against bivalence for sentences uses the following
rules, where Tr and Fa mean sentential truth and falsity, respectively.
12See, e.g., Sobel [1992] and Glanzberg [2001]. I should note that in that work Glanzberg repre-
sents propositions as sets of possible worlds. But he is quite clear that this is merely a simplifying
assumption, and that the claims of the work are not supposed to make essential use of this. He
writes:
e Liar paradox. . . is insensitive to issues of how nely structured propositionsmust
be. us, we may take the possible worlds view of propositions as at least a simpli-
fying assumption, regardless of whether the familiar arguments, such as those of
[Soames [1987]], ultimately show propositions to be structured entities. (2001: 245.)
13For example, Skyrms [1984], Sobel [1992] and Gaifman [2000].
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(TR) Tr(‘A’) / A
(FR) Fa(‘A’) / ¬A
For suppose that c = ‘¬Tr(c)’. We can thenderive fromTr(c): we haveTr(‘¬Tr(c)’)
(by c = ¬Tr(c)), and then ¬Tr(c) (by (TR)). And we can also derive  from Fa(c):
we get Fa(‘¬Tr(c)’), then ¬¬Tr(c) (by (FR)), and then Tr(c); and then  as before.
But then it seems that we should reject Tr(c)∨Fa(c)—an instance of bivalence for
sentences. However, LP of course allows us to give just the same argument against
bivalence for propositions, using propositional versions of (TR) and (FR). More
generally, it seems that any argument that uses Liar sentences to make trouble for
bivalence for sentences, will correspond to an equally convincing one that uses LP
to make trouble for bivalence for propositions. us, if Liar sentences should lead
us to give up the sentential principle, then it seems that LP should lead us to give
up the propositional one too.
e second group of reasons that the existence of LPmatters concern the tradi-
tional claim that Liar sentences fail to express propositions. For LP of course gives
rise to a paradox that cannot be solved by anything like this standard move. But,
further, it in fact seems to challenge this traditional claim. e rst reason that it
does this is simply that standard arguments for this claimuse propositional versions
of either the truth-schema or bivalence. But, as we have just seen, LP challenges
these.
For example, one such argument is as follows.14 Consider a Liar sentence of the
form ‘this sentence does not express a true proposition’. at is, suppose that b =
‘¬∃p(Exp(b, p) ∧ T(p))’ (where Exp(x , q) means that x expresses q). It is surely
the case that if b expresses a proposition, than that proposition is ¬∃p(Exp(b, p)∧
T(p)). at is, ∀q(Exp(b, q) → q = ¬∃p(Exp(b, p) ∧ T(p))). But now suppose
Exp(b, r). By (TP) and what we have just seen, T(r) ↔ ¬∃p(Exp(b, p) ∧ T(p)),
and thus ¬T(r).at is, ∀p(Exp(b, p)→ ¬T(p)), giving ¬∃p(Exp(b, p)∧T(p));
which, by (TP) again, gives T(r)—contradiction. us, ¬∃pExp(b, p). But of
course this argument is called into question once (TP) is.
Alternatively, one might argue for the claim that Liar sentences do not express
propositions using bivalence for propositions, together with (a) the claim that Liar
sentences are neither true nor false, and (b) the claim that if x expresses p, then x
is true (false) if p is true (false). But this argument is also called into question once
bivalence for propositions is.
14See, e.g., Sobel [1992] and Glanzberg [2001].
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Finally, the existence of LP also challenges the claim that Liar sentences fail to
express propositions for the following reason. e paradox that LP gives rise to is
obviously very similar to that which these sentences give rise to. It would thus seem
desirable to give similar solutions. But the solution in the propositional case will
not involve anything like the claim that something fails to express a proposition—
so it seems that the solution in the sentential case shouldn’t either.
5 Self-Referential Propositions: In Full
I will now ll in the outline of §2. More precisely, I will show how the constructions
of that section can be carried out in a natural, but more precisely stated, account of
propositions. is is essential, because a certain diculty emerges as soon as one
tries to think clearly about the nature of propositions.
Specically, the following.15 On the usual way of thinking about things, the
proposition that 1 is a (natural) number, for example, is something like the ordered
pair of the property of being a number N and 1: ⟨N , 1⟩. What, then, about the
proposition that the successor of 0 is a number, which (as explained in §2) one
wants to distinguish from this? It seems natural to think of this as (something like)
another ordered pair, but this time of N together with a complex of the successor
function s and 0, i.e. something like ⟨s, 0⟩. So the proposition would be ⟨N , ⟨s, 0⟩⟩.
But the problem is now easy to see. For if the result of combining 1 with N to
form ⟨N , 1⟩ is the proposition that 1 is a number, then shouldn’t the result of com-
bining ⟨s, 0⟩ with N in just the same way be the proposition that ⟨s, 0⟩—i.e. this
complex—is a number? And, if not, then what is the proposition that this complex
is a number?
emost natural way of solving this diculty would seem to be as follows. Give
up on the idea that the proposition that 1 is a number is anything like ⟨N , 1⟩. Rather,
it is (something like) the pair of N and (something like) the ‘ordered single’ of 1. I
use [1] for the latter component. I will state the resulting account of propositions
more precisely below. But the way in which it solves the diculty—i.e. allows us
to distinguish propositions that use complexes from those that mention them—
is this. e proposition that 1 is a number is ⟨N , [1]⟩. e proposition that the
successor of 0 is a number is ⟨N , [s, [0]]⟩, where [s, [0]] is a complex of s and [0]
(here the complex is used). Finally, the proposition that this complex is a number
is ⟨N , [[s, [0]]]⟩ (where, of course, [[s, [0]]] is the ordered single of [s, [0]]; here
15is diculty is mentioned in Kaplan [1989: 496]. Kaplan does not say in any detail how it
should be solved, but the solution below is in the general direction that he suggests.
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the complex is mentioned). And these last two propositions are distinct because[s, [0]] ≠ [[s, [0]]]—solving the diculty.
More generally, propositions are as follows.
5.1 Simple Terms
I assume that for every object x, there is an object [x], called a simple (propositional)
term. I call x the constituent of [x].
What exactly is an object? All that I will assume is that numbers are objects, as
are simple terms, and complex terms and propositions (to be introduced below).
But if one does not think that terms or propositions are really objects, then one can
simply read my uses of ‘object’ as ‘object, term or proposition’.
In ZFU, one can easily dene (ordered) n-tuples, for n ≥ 1, such that the fol-
lowing is satised.16 (‘X’ is for ‘extensionality’.)
(X) If the m-tuple of x1, . . . , xm (in that order) is identical to the l-tuple of y1,
. . . yl (in that order), then m = l and x1 = y1, . . . , xm = yl .
In the following, I assume that we have settled on one such denition, and use
n-tuple (and similar) to mean n-tuple (and similar) so dened.
e ordered single of x is at least a natural model of [x]. I will give similar
models of complex terms and propositions below. Now, on one version of the ac-
count being proposed, terms andpropositionswould in fact be identiedwith these
models. However, this version would seem to face a problem similar to that which
Benacerraf [1965] raises for identications of numbers with sets. at problem is
simply that since there are multiple, apparently equally good, ways of modelling
numbers with sets, any such identication would appear arbitrary. But any attempt
to identify terms and propositions with sets would seem to face a similar issue: why
use one denition of n-tuples rather than another, for example?17
In the number case, the natural lesson would seem to be that these are sui
generis objects, and so not reducible to sets or anything else. And the natural les-
son in the propositional case would seem to be similar. For this reason, I will not
assume that the models of this section tell us what terms and propositions really
are. Rather, they aremeant simply to convey the sort of way in which these are con-
structed from their basic constituents, such as objects, functions and properties.
16For example, one can dene the n-tuple of x1, . . . , xn as {J1, x1K, . . . , Jn, xnK}, where Ji , x iK is{{i}, {i , x i}}.
17For discussions of versions of this problem for accounts of propositions, see Jubien [2001], King
[2007: 47–50, 127–36] and Soames [2010: 91–94].
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Indeed, all that one needs to assume about simple terms is the following, which
of course holds in the suggested set-theoretic model by (X).
(XS) If [x] = [y], then x = y.
5.2 Complex Terms
I assume that there are also complex (propositional) terms generated recursively as
follows: if n ≥ 1, f is an n-place function, and t1, . . . , tn are simple or complex
terms, then there is a complex term [ f , t1, . . . , tn]. Once again, f , t1, . . . , tn are the
constituents of [ f , t1, . . . , tn]. And a natural model of [ f , t1, . . . , tn] is the n+1-tuple
of f , t1, . . . , tn (in that order).
To be clear, I am not suggesting that set theory can be used to give natural mod-
els of functions, at least not in the standard way (see §3). Rather, I am suggesting
that it can be used to give a natural model of [ f , t1, . . . , tn]—but in this model f is
an urelement. What then are functions? It is beyond the scope of this paper to say
in any detail. All that is required for my purposes here is that certain straightfor-
ward ones exist (i.e. d and the variants of it considered in §2). But I would suggest
thinking of functions as sui generis objects—as ways of going from one object to
another (or from a number of objects to another)—in the same way that it is plau-
sible to think of numbers or sets as sui generis objects.
e natural assumptions about complex terms are as follows.
(XC) If [ f , t1, . . . , tn] = [g , u1, . . . um], then n = m and f = g, t1 = u1, . . . , tn = um.
(SC) No complex term is a simple term.
Again, these hold in the suggested set-theoreticmodel by (X). It is (SC) that ensures
that the diculty raised at the start of this section is solved.
5.3 Atomic Propositions
Next, I assume that if n ≥ 1, H is an n-place property, and t1, . . . , tn are (simple
or complex) terms, then there is an object ⟨H, t1, . . . , tn⟩, called an atomic propo-
sition. H, t1, . . . , tn are the constituents of ⟨H, t1, . . . , tn⟩.18 A natural model of
18Note that the dened use of ‘constituent’ is slightly narrower than that of previous sections.
For on the former 0 is not a constituent of the proposition ⟨N , [0]⟩; rather, it is a constituent of a
constituent of this proposition.
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⟨H, t1, . . . , tn⟩ is again the corresponding n + 1-tuple. I use dierent brackets for
terms and propositions just for readability.
e natural assumptions are: (XA), i.e. the analogue of (XC) for atomic propo-
sitions, and that no atomic proposition is a term.ese hold in the suggestedmodel
by (X), as long as no property is a function (which I assume).⟨H, [a]⟩ is the proposition that a isH, ⟨H, [ f , [a]]⟩ is the proposition that f (a)
is H, and so on.
us, ⟨N , [1]⟩ is the proposition that 1 is a number; ⟨N , [s, [0]]⟩ is the proposi-
tion that s(0) is a number; and ⟨N , [[s, [0]]]⟩ is that to the eect that [s, [0]] (i.e.
this complex term) is a number.e rst and second are distinct by (XA), together
with the fact that no simple term is a complex one (i.e. (SC)); and the second and
third are distinct for the same reason. So the diculty raised at the start of this
section is solved as anticipated.
(What about the distinctness or otherwise of the rst and third propositions?
ese will indeed be distinct as long as 1 is distinct from the complex term [s, [0]].
is is highly plausible. However, it does not follow from the explicit assumptions
above, since none of these have any bearing on what numbers are.)
Here is a further example that will help make clear the way in which the ac-
count works—and the way in which it allows us to distinguish propositions that
are about (i.e. mention) terms from those that have them as constituents (i.e. use
them).us, let i be the identity function.en the proposition that i(0) is 0, that
is, ⟨=, [i , [0]], [0]⟩, is of course true. —Despite the fact that the two constituents
of this proposition are distinct (by (SC)). For the proposition is not about the con-
stituents. What (SC) commits us to is rather the falsity of ⟨=, [[i , [0]]], [[0]]⟩ (the
identity proposition that mentions the terms that the last proposition used).
5.4 Compound Propositions
Finally, I assume that there are negated and conjoined propositions generated re-
cursively as follows: if p and q are atomic, negated or conjoined propositions, then
there is a negated proposition (¬, p) and a conjoined proposition (∧, p, q). I also
call negated and conjoined propositions negations and conjunctions (respectively); ¬
and p are the constituents of (¬, p), and ∧, p and q are those of (∧, p, q). e idea
is that ¬ and ∧ are abstract entities corresponding to the English words ‘not’ and
‘and’ (respectively), but nothing will turn on what exactly these are. Negations and
conjunctions are once again naturally modelled by pairs and triples (respectively).
e natural assumptions are similar to those in the atomic case: i.e. (¬, p) = (¬, q)
entails p = q; no negation is a conjunction, atomic proposition or term; and sim-
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ilarly for conjunctions. ese will hold in the model given (X), together with the
assumption that no function is a property.
If H and J are 1-place properties and a and b are objects, then (¬, ⟨H, [a]⟩) is
the proposition that it is not the case that a is H; and (∧, ⟨H, [a]⟩, ⟨J , [b]⟩) is that
to the eect that a is H and b is J. And so on.
One could straightforwardly extend this account to quantied propositions,
but for reasons of space I will not do this here.
5.5 Self-Referential Propositions
We now have a precisely stated framework in which to construct self-referential
propositions, following the outline of §2.
us, let Z be the proposition ⟨=, [0], [0]⟩. And let d be a function such that
for any proposition p, d(p) is the result of replacing all occurrences of Z in p with
p itself (as before, d(Z) = Z). For example, if p is (¬, Z), then d(p) is (¬, (¬, Z));
and if p is ⟨T , [Z]⟩, then d(p) is ⟨T , [⟨T , [Z]⟩]⟩. Once again, for deniteness, let
d(x) = 0 for any x that is not a proposition. As we saw in §3, it seems hard to deny
that such a function exists.
In addition to the arguments of §3, one can also provide set-theoretic models
along the lines suggested above in which such a function exists. at is, §§5.1–
5.4 describe a family of set-theoretic models of propositions, in which functions,
properties, ¬ and ∧ are urelements. But it is straightforward to extend anymember
of this family to one in which d exists. (For reasons of space I leave this as an
exercise for the reader.)
e construction of self-referential propositions can then proceed as in §2.
us, let LP be the following.
(¬, ⟨T , [d , [(¬, ⟨T , [d , [Z]]⟩)]]⟩)
As before, we have:
(1*) d((¬, ⟨T , [d , [Z]]⟩)) = LP.
at is, LP says of itself that it is untrue.
We then have a purely propositional version of the Liar. For if p is a proposition,
then (¬, ⟨T , [d , [p]]⟩) is that to the eect that d(p) is not true. So it seems that this
should be true i d(p) is not. In particular:
(2*) LP is true i d((¬, ⟨T , [d , [Z]]⟩)) is not.
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Giving:
(3*) LP is true i it is not.
Similarly for the other propositions constructed in §2 (i.e. other self-referential
propositions and those that form more complex networks).
erefore, given a precise and apparently natural account of propositions, the
constructions of §2 can be straightforwardly carried out. e above should also
make plausible, however, that this will similarly be possible on any alternative such
account (at least on which propositions are structured).
us, if propositions are structured, they can be self-referential, and a range of
apparently plausible claims about truth will have to be rethought.19
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